IS Iran replaying its revolution of 30 years ago?
At first glance, there are many similarities between this revolt and the 1979 one.
First, the streets of Tehran and other major cities have become the power struggle’s principal arena.
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In 1979, a big part of Iranian society had lost all faith in institutional politics. The parliament was discredited, because it was composed of the members of a single party, Rastakhiz (Renaissance), set up by the shah. The Council of Ministers, headed by the prime minister, was dismissed as irrelevant if only because all power rested with the monarch.
Because there were no parties to act as an interface between the power elite and the broader society, small groups of militants, often operating in the streets, acted as vehicles for political expression.
Today, we have a similar situation. Within just a few days, all institutions of the state have ceased to function properly. Communication within the political elite is no longer conducted through those institutions but via street rallies and counterdemonstrations.
Second, both struggles began as efforts to enforce the existing constitution.
In 1979, the shah was criticized for having violated the 1906 Constitution, notably by preventing political pluralism and imposing a one-party system. Today’s movement started as a protest of the alleged rigging of the June 12 presidential election, in violation of the 1979 Constitution.
The 1979 movement quickly went beyond its initial aim, re-emerging as a revolutionary bid to change the regime. Today, we’re witnessing the rapid transformation of what started as a protest against electoral fraud into a bid for regime change.
Mir Hussein Mousavi, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s leading rival, has put it clearly in his latest statement: “This is no longer just about an election. It is about the nature of the system as a whole.”
The 1979 uprising represented an unusually broad coalition, with at least a dozen leftist groups and almost as many Islamist factions along with nationalist, social-democratic and liberal outfits.
The same is true today. Dozens of different opposition groups — ranging all the way from moderate Khomeinist to monarchist — have come together to challenge the regime under a single umbrella.
But the differences between the 1979 events and those of today are even more striking.
To start with, the ruling establishment back then remained reasonably united until the very end. Even after the shah had left the country, no key regime figure switched sides. Today, however, the ruling elite is split down the middle. Almost as many regime dignitaries have sided with Mousavi as have backed Ahmadinejad.
In 1979, the people looked to the Shiite clergy for leadership. This time, the clergy is pushed into the background. The new “moral references” of Iranian society are no longer clerics; they are intellectuals, academics, lawyers and independent trade-union leaders. Whatever the struggle’s outcome, one thing is certain: Mullahs will never regain their position of moral authority in Iranian politics.
Another difference is that the ruling elite in 1979 had little stomach for a fight. Many of its members had homes and investments abroad and thus could just pack and leave — they weren’t forced to fight with their backs to the wall.
But the overwhelming majority of today’s ruling elite has no fallback position. If driven from power, “Supreme Guide” Ali Khamenei or Ahmadinejad would have nowhere to go. They have no choice but to fight to the bitter end. This time, it is in the opposition camp that one finds most of those who can pack and go to golden exile abroad.
There’s yet another difference. In 1979, a majority of Iranians would probably have voted for the shah, had there been elections. Few, however, were prepared to fight for him in the streets. This time, the regime may well lose a free and fair election but still is capable of fielding large numbers of supporters who are ready to die and kill for it.
Finally, one must take into account differences between the shah and Khamenei.
The shah had no stomach for bloody repression. His constant, and rather charmingly naive, motto was: “A king cannot kill his own people.”
In contrast, Khamenei has built his career as a tough street fighter. In his Friday sermon in Tehran declaring war on the opposition, he made it clear that he wouldn’t shy away from a bloodbath in order to prevent regime change.
The perception that the shah was weak and unwilling to hit back played a crucial role in disheartening his supporters and encouraging his opponents. That perception was one reason so many of his closest aides simply fled the country at the first opportunity.
So is Iran heading for a civil war? My answer is a cautious no.
In a history spanning more than 2,500 years, the nation has seen only three events that can be described as civil wars: in the 5th century BC, in the 6th century AD and in 1911.
The reason is that as a power struggle builds up, Iranians know how to distinguish the side that’s going to win. Once they’ve identified the winner, they will all rally to his side. No one is left on the other side to provoke a civil war.
Call it opportunism, if you like, but this is a part of the template of Iranian politics.
One’s only hope is that the side that realizes it’s losing won’t deny the evidence and will agree to bow out without provoking a prolonged and bloody conflict.
Amir Taheri’s latest book is “The Persian Night: Iran Under the Khomeinist Revolution.”